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Debt rescheduling is the event that occurs when a less 
developed country is no longer able to meet its debt payments to 
its creditors. When a country cannot make its payments, it must 
renegotiate its loan agreements or obtain monetary aid from outside 
sources. Because rescheduling can involve large amounts of money, 
it is very important for those insti tutions that lend to less 
developed countries to be able predict the event and hence be 
better able to manage their own cash flows and use their money more 
efficiently. 
This paper will examine two aspects of debt rescheduling; 
research already completed and some of the measures used in that 
research. It will look at a few of the studies done on Third World 
debt rescheduling, noting the procedures used, the variables 
included, and the results and conclusions. It will also look at 
al ternate ways to predict debt rescheduling and compare these 
methods to the ones in earlier studies. The second section will 
look at the factors affecting some of the measures used in studying 
Third World debt and evaluating the risk of a country. The paper 
will conclude with a summary of the topics discussed and this 
author's conclusions. A summary of the studies and their findings 
can be found in exhibit 1. 
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1) Advance warning Indicators 
The first study I will cover is by Dr. Fuad A. Abdullah at the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. In his article in the Journal of 
International Business studies, "Development of an Advance Warning 
Indicator Of External Debt Servicing Vulnerability", he 
describes the objective of developing a leading indicator of 
external debt servicing vulnerability that could warn of a 
country's developing inability to make its payments. Dr. Abdullah 
used information from past studies to single out a few variables 
that directly preceded debt servicing difficulties in many 
countries. He found that all or most of the following events 
existed in countries experiencing payment problems: 
1. A significant erosion in the international liquidity position. 
2. A sharply faster growth rate of external debt than the rate of 
growth in export earnings. 
3. An acceleration in the inflation rate experienced by the 
country. 
4. A shortfall in exports or a deterioration in export 
performance. 
5. Adverse internal political developments. 
He used an index that was a weighted average of sub-indices or 
ratios that measure recent changes in the above variables. He 
applied the index to 20 less developed countries (LDCs) that 
accounted for about eighty percent of external debt. He grouped 
these count.ries into five categories that ranged from significant 
improvement. in their debt servicing capacity to those that 
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signalled an imminent payments interruption. The Payments 
Interruption Likelihood Index (PILI) weights the above events in 
this way: 2.5 to the first two, 1.5 to the second two and 2.0 to 
the political situation. He thus comes up with a base number of 
10, those above the base have improving debt servicing positions, 
and those below have deteriorating positions. He classified the 
countries into five categories according to their PILI score. 
category one included those signalling improvement by having a 
score of 11 or higher. category two countries signal no change and 
have a score between 9 and 11. category three included those that 
signal possible future problems and have a score between 8 and 9. 
category four countries signal likely payments interruption and 
score between 6 and 8. category five included those signaling 
imminent payments interruption and score under 6. 
Dr. Abdullah's index correctly identified five countries that 
rescheduled their debt by putting them in category four. One 
country in category three also rescheduled. The countries in 
category one had recently completed their rescheduling and were 
showing not~iceable improvement. 
Dr. Abdullah's index seems to be an improvement in the field 
of predicting developing countries' debt servicing problems. There 
are several other approaches, however, and the next one I will 
examine is a much more complex logit model to predict debt 
rescheduling. 
--
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2) Logit Model of Debt Rescheduling 
William R. Cline, in his article "A Logit Model of Debt 
Rescheduling 1969-82", developed a model that may be used to 
identify when a country is approaching the need to reschedule. The 
model is based on the economic theories of supply and demand: the 
supply of rescheduling and the demand for rescheduling. Cline 
showed that both are affected by many factors, both internal and 
external. Demand is a downward sloping curve while supply has and 
upward slope. For most countries these two meet at an equilibrium 
point, but as a country's demand rises or the supply falls, the 
curves develop a supply gap and are in disequilibrium. Factors 
such as tightening world credit due to global economic factors or 
an unusually nervous international climate for lending will move 
the supply curve down and to the left. Domestic crop failures, a 
collapse in world markets, higher world interest rates and the 
resulting claims on foreign exchange, are examples of factors that 
can move the demand curve up and to the right. This equilibrium 
gap can sometimes be bridged by contractionary measures within the 
country and through guidance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) . Thl~ announcement of these actions may help to shift the 
curves back to an equilibrium point, but if the situation is dire 
enough even these would not help and rescheduling occurs. The 
ability to predict or anticipate when a country will reschedule is 
one that could greatly benefit the world capital markets. The more 
able these markets are to see a rescheduling coming, the better 
able they will be to prepare and manage the situation. This would 
--
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serve to help stabilize the markets and shift the supply curve 
permanently up and to the right. 
Cline stated that there were twelve factors that need to be 
considered when evaluating a country's position in the current 
economic environment; they are: 
pRD :Probability that a country will seek rescheduling 
Demand Side: 
2. pRD -- f2 (RSM)-
Supply Side: 
6. pRs == f6 (DSR) + 
6' .pRs = f6(NDX) + 
Debt Service Ratio, this has a 
positive impact on the probability 
Level of reserves relative to imports, 
this has a negative impact 
The country's rate of domestic 
economic growth, this has a negative 
impact 
Growth rate of per capita income, 
negative effect 
Ratio of the current account deficit 
to exports of goods and services, 
negative effect 
Debt Service Ratio, positive effect 
Ratio of Net Debt(gross debt minus 
reserves) is an alternative measure 
to the debt service ratio, positive 
effect 
--
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P is a measure of inflation, D is the 
total outstanding debt, and X 
represents exports of goods and 
services. The term pD is the amount 
of inflationary erosion of debt, 
negative effect 
Amortization rate, negative effect 
Level of per capita income, negative 
effect 
The country's savings rate where sis 
the ratio of domestic savings to 
GNP, negative effect 
Recent growth rate of exports, negative 
effect 
Measure of global credit abundance, 
negative effect 
Canceling the opposing factors, we can get a short form of this 
equation, where z! is the variable indicating rescheduling in the 
year!. We arrive at the logit model: 
Zt=b1DSRt_1+b2RSMt_1+b3gt +b4Yt +bs (h[CAXJ~t_1+b7 (pDt -1/Xt -1) +bSAt-1+b10St-1+b11gx t +b1zLt· 
- - - - -- -- -- - - - - - -- -- -~ --
This can be altered by substituting (b§.NDX) for the first term 
(blDSR~) as an alternative indicator of debt burden as mentioned 
above. 
The logit method allows for the dependent variable z to be 
transformed into a probability equation for rescheduling: 
plC=l/ (1 +e.:.!) , 
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where pBc is the composite indicator of the probability of 
rescheduling and e is the natural logarithm. The probability can 
range from zero (as z approaches negative infinity) to one (as z 
approaches positive infinity). 
Dr. Cline then applied this equation to several models, the 
changes being the inclusion or removal of certain key variables, to 
see which ones had the greatest statistical effect. The most 
statistically significant model included measures of: debt-service 
ratio, ratio of reserves to imports, amortization rate, current 
account deficit relative to exports, growth rate of per capita GOP, 
and a variable for global borrowing. The models used data from 
sixty countries over a period of fifteen years (1968-1982). After 
adjusting for missing data and for omissions immediately following 
an actual rescheduling, there were a total of 670 observations. 
Twenty-two reschedulings occurred in the time frame and the model 
only failed to predict a rescheduling 9.1 percent of the time and 
predicted Cl rescheduling when none occurred only 13.0 percent of 
the time. .A close examination of the results led Dr. CI ine to find 
that there is a difference between large and small debtor 
countries. It appears that small debtor countries reach a 
rescheduling stage at lower levels of debt burden than do the 
larger countries. Because of this and due to the fact that large 
debtor countries have the most effect on the world financial 
system, another model was created using the 31 large debtor 
countries in order to more accurately predict rescheduling in this 
class of countries. The model proved to be very accurate, 
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predicting almost all the rescheduling on or the year before the 
actual event at a cutoff rate of .24. 
The logit model approach appears to be a very good tool for 
evaluating a country's financial position and its ability to 
service its debt. If its implied assumption that a country with a 
deteriorating political situation will also be experiencing 
financial difficulty, holds true, then the exclusion of a political 
adjustment factor may be justified. It seems this important 
measure cannot be ignored in light of the fact that in almost all 
of these countries, a major shift in the political environment can 
mean a drastic change in course for the whole country. The logit 
model seems to prove that this assumption does hold true, for the 
statistical test of the results are certainly viable and definitely 
show this method to be one to consider. 
3) Debt Rescheduling Indicators and Models 
The next study to be examined was submitted to the Journal of 
International Business Studies in 1985 by Dr. John B. Morgan of 
Data Resources, Inc .. "A New Look at Debt Rescheduling Indicators 
and Models", presented both logit and discriminate analysis of debt 
rescheduling. 
This article stressed the need to continually reevaluate the 
evaluation techniques used to predict debt reschedulings. As the 
world financial situation changes, new measures and standards are 
needed to help us to determine the possibility of a rescheduling. 
As previous discussions have pointed out, it is vital in the 
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volatile world of global finance to be able to assess a country's 
financial position and its ability to service its debt load. Dr. 
Morgan attempted in this article to consolidate information from 
earlier studies and to new models that include new short term data 
in logit and discriminate approaches. 
Dr. Morgan found that due to the time frame in which earlier 
models' data were based, they now over or under-estimate debt 
reschedulings. A revision of the variables and a change in the 
time frame to include the last two recessions and the two oil price 
shocks gives the model new data to create a better forecast than 
those it builds upon. 
The model can be divided into three categories; supply, demand 
and exogenous shock indicators. The supply indicators used were: 
total debt to exports, short-term debt to exports, principal 
payments to total debt (the amortization rate), and the current 
debt service ratio. The demand indicators were; the current 
account balance (proxy: exports to imports), international 
reserves, and the international reserves to imports. Exogenous 
variables i.ncluded; the percent of variable interest rate loans to 
total medium and long-term debt multiplied by the u.s. prime rate 
(as a measure of interest rate shocks to the country), the ratio of 
total bank lending to the non-oil developing countries divided by 
the total current account deficits of the non-oil developing 
countries, and real GOP growth. The data included 240 observations 
of nine indicators. Of these, there were 40 reschedulings or 16.6 
-11 
percent. 
The logi t analysis consisted of two models with different 
combinations of the variables. Most significant in model A was the 
current account deficit, and in model B the reserves to imports 
ratio proved to be the significant indicator. Using a cutoff rate 
of .33 resulted in 7 misclassifications of countries that 
rescheduled and 14 predictions of rescheduling when none occurred, 
with an overall accuracy rate of 91.3%. Morgan found that when he 
adjusted his data base by dropping data for a country for two years 
after a rescheduling, as Cline did in the above study, that the 
model was less sensitive than when the data was retained. Morgan 
concluded that the procedure of dropping data for the two years 
following a rescheduling does not appear to improve the model. 
Morgan used the same data base to produce a discriminate model 
using the six variables in his B model: reserves to imports, total 
debt to exports, short-term debt to imports, the interest rate 
sensitivity indicator, the bank lending indicator, and the real GDP 
growth ratf~. Because the two approaches were based on the same 
data, a direct comparison can be made. The discriminant model had 
an accuracy rate 85.4%, and the differences in errors were small 
between the two models when the logit model B was subjected to a 
.16 cutoff point to equalize the percentage of misclassification 
and non-prediction errors. 
These models improved on the ones that precede them because 
they captured the effects of the period from 1975 to 1982, and 
under statistical examination proved to generate significant 
.-
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results. 
4) Forecasting Methodology 
The last study I will discuss is from Briance Mascarenhas and 
Ole Christian Sand, of New York University and Elkon Finans A/S 
(Oslo, Norway), respectively. This article examined forecasting 
methodology in predicting international debt reschedulings. Three 
approaches were compared, single-method, raw-data combination, and 
forecast combinations. The authors are again concerned over the 
ability to design a more accurate forecast for international 
business analysis due to the volatility of the environment. 
Most studies in international business today are based on the 
single-method forecast approach. This method is the most well 
known and is represented by the studies above. 
A raw data combination approach combines the original data 
from more than one forecast to develop a new data base. An example 
of this type is combining an objective indicator model with a 
subjective country-risk rating model. 
in a subjective rating utilized 
Certainly some of the data 
some amount of objective 
indicators, but as long as there is a difference in the data bases, 
there should be an improvement with the combination. However, 
improvement is not guaranteed, and close comparison of the data 
sets is essential to determine the number of variables coinciding 
and the resultant loss of observations. 
The forecast combination approach is related to the 
diversification strategies found in Wall Street. By combining two 
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or more forecasts, one should be able to magnify their strengths 
and minimize their weakness, thereby arriving at a more accurate 
forecast. Various methods exist as how to combine forecasts. 
Equal weighting has little theoretical justification, but it has 
performed well empirically. Regression based weighting methods 
have a good theoretical base, but they have performed poorly 
empirically due to the lack of the large amounts of data for each 
period that: is required for an accurate error measure. 
Another method of forecast combination has been proposed 
(Gupta and Wilson [1987]) that may be a more appropriate approach 
to taking into account weights for the accuracy of the forecasts 
involved: the odds-matrix method. This method compares two 
forecasts using a matrix to compute the probability that one 
forecast wi.ll out perform another. This method does not require an 
exact error measure like the regression-based methods because the 
relative performance can produce the odds by comparing which 
forecast had a predicted a higher (lower) probability of a country 
rescheduling when the country actually did (did not) reschedule. 
For this comparison the period 1980-1984 is examined because 
it encompasses major economic events and the most recent data (at 
the time of the study). Forty countries were included and a cutoff 
rate of 0.50 was used in the six models compared: the naive 
approach, objective indicator approach, banker's sUbjective 
judgement, raw data combination, forecast combination with equal 
weighting, and the forecast combination using the odds-matrix. 
--
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The ned ve approach model was used as a benchmark using an 
equal probability of correctly assigning the countries to the right 
classification. This gives an expected number of countries 
correctly classified as half of the number of observed cases or .50 
times 116=58. The model resulted in correctly identifying 58 of 
the 116 cases. 
The objective indicator model used four economic variables: 
domestic inflation rate, real growth in gross domestic product, 
ratio of total external debt to exports, and the ratio of external 
debt service payments to exports. This model correctly predicted 
76 of the 116 cases in the hold out period but failed to predict 
any cases in the base period. A possible explanation is that the 
variables used were no longer as significant as they were in the 
models from earlier periods. 
The banker's subjective judgement model has only one 
independent variable, which is the Institutional Investor's country 
risk rating. This is a compilation of the individual subjective 
ratings from executives of about 100 leading banks. This model 
correctly predicted only 73 of the 116 cases in the hold-out period 
and predicted more rescheduling cases than model two. Although 
model two's overall accuracy is higher, the results may be 
meaningless and costly for banks. 
The raw data combination model used the raw data from models 
one and two. To reduce the amount of repeated data, a regression 
was used and the residuals were then included with the objective 
--
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indicators from model two to form the data base for this model. 
This model represented an increase in accuracy over the former 
models from which its data was taken as it accurately predicted 79 
cases. 
Foreca.st combination with equal weighting used the results 
from models two and three to arrive at a final probability 
prediction. This model proved to be even more accurate, predicting 
82 of the 116 cases. 
The forecast combination using odds-matrix weighted the 
accuracy of models two and three in the hold-out period and then 
used the weights to combine the forecasts to arrive at a final 
prediction.. This model had the highest accuracy of all the models, 
correctly predicting 85 of the 116 cases. 
This article provides evidence that forecasting accuracy may 
be improved through diversification, either through combining the 
raw data itself or through combining the forecasts results. 
Accuracy improved in this study as we moved from the naive approach 
to the most. accurate method using the combination of forecasts with 
the odds-matrix method of weighting. The odds-matrix method proved 
to have the only statistically significant advantage over the other 
non-naive a.pproaches. However, the forecasts used are the major 
factor in the accuracy of the combination. Due to the nature of 
the odds-matrix using forecasts based on prior periods to predict 
in future periods, single method approaches may still outperform 
combination methods and therefore cannot be abandoned. 
--
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5) Early warning Indicators 
This next section of the paper will examine the variables used 
in the various forecasting approaches. 
The first article, by F.N. Burton and H. Inoue, "An Appraisal 
of the Early-Warning Indicators of Sovereign Loan Default in 
country Risk Evaluation Systems", looks at current measures used in 
evaluating country risk. We have seen that there are many methods 
of forecasting debt servicing difficulties in LDCs and that the 
choice makes a big difference in the results obtained. The same is 
even more t.rue with the variables used in the study. The raw data 
compiled to create a forecast can take many forms and shapes and it 
is the creators job to limit the amount and type of data in some 
way so that. to use the forecast in the future, one does not have to 
collect truckloads of data to compute a new rating. The job of 
limi ting is both subj ecti ve and obj ecti ve. It incorporates the 
creators views and also his calculations to determine which 
variables appear to be relevant and significant from the data base 
he is working with. 
forecast. 
Once he has done that, he can create his 
Variables can be separated into four groups: domestic economy 
related variables, external economy related variables, external 
debt related variables, and finally, others. The authors strive to 
point out t:hat the selection process for the variables currently in 
use is rather poor and should be upgraded to produce the results 
and accuracy bankers and others in the financial community require. 
They argue that the selection of objective indicators has mostly 
--
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been based on banker's feeling and then becomes much more 
subj ecti ve and open to debate. They claim that the selection 
should be based on theoretical deduction and empirical 
verification. 
The Domestic Economy: Variables included here represent the 
economic position of the country involved. 
National Income: These include GNP, GNP growth rates, and GNP 
per capita,. which measure the ability of the country to survive 
through periods of contraction as a method of correcting external 
imbalance. The main problems with these measure are unsatisfactory 
exchange rates used to get comparable measures and the tendency to 
understate poor countries' and overstate rich countries' relative 
performancE~. with per capita GNP, there also seems to be a problem 
in assessing its trend. Currently it is considered to be a linear 
function of debt servicing capability, when in actuality it is 
probably more U-shaped, with the low and high income countries 
having more difficulty handling their debt than the middle income 
countries. 
The Money Supply and Budgetary Balance: These represent the 
countries' fiscal management ability. Included are, monetary, 
fiscal, and exchange rate policies. Frequently inflation rates 
have been regarded as a good measure, but it has been the 
countries' response to inflation through monetary expansion or 
contraction that has had a greater impact on a country's ability to 
service debt and its loan default risk. 
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The External Economy: These variables focus on the country's 
relative position in the world market and the resultant effect on 
debt servicing capability. 
Exports: Overall export performance has been regarded as an 
important variable; however, the ratios of export performance have 
been shown to be more relevant than sheer volume. Export growth 
may also be an erroneous factor due to its fluctuation. It 
generally tends to decline, rather than sustain, after a period of 
expansion. 
Imports: Both import growth and volume measures have been 
included in banker's studies, but a better measure may be some 
ratio that measures the reliance of a country on essential imports 
such as food and energy to total imports or GDP. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves: Reserves measure the ability to 
withstand a shift in the balance of payments and can be considered 
an important variable. However, the standard by which to judge 
these reserves are unfounded and may make an absolute number 
meaningless. Other measures such as liquidity of reserves or the 
proportions hedged against private loans and which constitute 
borrowing could better reflect the 
strength. 
country's foreign reserve 
Other Components of the Balance of Payments: Variables such 
as foreign and direct investment, foreign aid, loans and IMF 
borrowings may be useful in predicting loan default, but accurate 
measures of these items have yet to be developed. 
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Debt Related Factors: These factors focus on variables due to 
the actual debt a country carries. 
External Debt outstanding: The main difficulty with this 
measure is that there is no firm way to set an acceptable level. 
Credit worthiness varies widely between countries with comparable 
size and level of debt. A better measure may be the proportion of 
debt outstanding to the value of exports, but even this measure or 
its related measure, proportion of debt outstanding to GNP, do not 
take into account other aspects of debt such as interest payments, 
maturity dates, and grace periods. 
Maturity composition: This is generally measured by the ratio 
of amortization to the total debt outstanding. The problem is that 
there is no generally accepted implication of this measure; 
however, empirical tests have shown that a higher ratio indicates 
a rescheduling case. 
Debt Service Ratio: This is the most common and quickest 
method of 'testing debt servicing capability. Studies have shown 
that ratios in the 15% to 20% range signify a country at risk of 
default. This measure tends to disregard some important 
information and the data used to compute the ratio lags two to 
three years. Another problem is that it does not consider the 
amount due, only what was actually paid, thus making the ratio low 
in years of default and high in the year preceding the maturity 
payment. There are also difficulties in the estimation of DSRs in 
years when the LIBOR rate varies widely. statistical analysis 
proves to show little significance in this measure. 
--
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Other Factors: These focus on the administrative ability and 
the socio-political situation in a country. Bankers often give 
these high weights, as much as fifty percent, but the measures are 
highly subjective and non-systematic. 
Admini.strative Ability: Monetary and fiscal variables may 
give some indication of this factor as administrative ability 
highly affects these areas. The government's ability to manage the 
country may have an affect on its ability to counteract downturns 
in the economy. Administrative inability may generate debt 
servicing difficulties if the government is not able to institute 
proper corrective measures. 
Political Instability: This factor can affect loan payments 
either directly or indirectly. A leader of a country may 
voluntarily suspend payments of interest and loans especially 
during times of war or after a hostile takeover and the resulting 
change in leadership. A leader may move his country into a 
position of economic difficulty through an act of war, or domestic 
violence may sufficiently disrupt the economic system so as to make 
the country unable to pay. The authors have constructed a chart to 
attempt to quantify the political factors and therefore enable 
analysts to include these factor in their models. 
The authors claim that despite the evidence that political 
instability is one of the greatest risks that suppliers of funds 
face in Third World countries, it has been widely ignored. with 
their method of placing these variables in a table format, one 
should be able to make some sort of quantitative analysis and 
--
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derive a usable measure from this information. 
6) Country Risk Ratings 
A related article by Dr. Erwin Dichtl and Hans Georg Koglmayr, 
both of the University of Manheim in Germany, takes a look at the 
validity of country risk ratings. 
The authors examine a rating that closely approximates the 
Business Environment Risk Index (BERI): the "Manager Magazin" (rom) 
country test. As opposed to the BERI's assessment compiled from 
100 experts working in groups of ten to fifteen making three 
assessments per year of forty-five markets, the rom test is composed 
of assessments of 225 experts in groups of between three and eight, 
assessing once a year fifty-three countries. 
The authors analyzed the rom test as to how it compares to 
other forms of assigning risk to third world countries. The test 
showed a high correlation with objective data of the countries in 
question using twenty-five key variables. A surprising result 
occurred from the examination of the data. They found that who a 
country borrows money from, makes a big difference in the country's 
perceived risk. Loans from the Bank for International Settlements 
gives the country a good image, while assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund tends to give the country an image of 
being despE~rate. The rom test was designed to help business assess 
the risk in a certain country to aid in its decision to invest in 
that country. We can, then, test to see if businesses, in fact, 
avoid countries with high risk. What we find is that there seems 
--
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to be little correlation here; the businesses seem to place higher 
value on trouble free labor relations and established trade 
relations. This reveals that no matter what source country risk 
ratings come from, they seem to be under-utilized. The 
corporations tend to prefer specific relationships and contact to 
objective or expert subjective opinion. 
The mm test was then subject to a comparison of 
sUbjective ratings to determine if the mm test was valid. 
other 
The 
Institutional Investors Index and the Euromoney surveys selected 
for their match of method (in the case of the III), and their 
opposing method (the Euromoney approach is that risk is reflected 
in the credit terms awarded to countries if the loans are backed by 
public mortgages). The mm test correlated highly with these two 
measures providing evidence that the mm test is indeed valid. 
The authors conclude that the subjective ratings are in truth 
no better than objective data and in financial terms are much more 
expensive to generate than objective forecasts: access costs can 
often run into the thousands of dollars. They believe that many of 
the sUbjective ratings are based on questionable criteria and do 
not justify the high cost and therefore recommend the usage of 
objective data in an advanced forecasting technique. 
7) Capital Flight 
Another measure commonly used in rescheduling forecasts, is 
described in Michael P. Dooley's article, "Capital Flight: A 
Response to Differences in Financial Risks". Mr. Dooley explains 
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the causes behind capital flight and how to better understand this 
activity. 
Mr. Dooley uses a slightly different definition of capital 
flight in order to differentiate between normal portfolio 
considerations and the intent to place assets outside of the 
resident cCluntry's control. He defines capital flight as "the 
stock of claims on nonresidents that do not generate investment 
income receipts in the creditor country's balance of payments 
data" . He states that three variables may serve as determinants of 
capital flight: domestic inflation, financial repression, and the 
risk premium. 
Domestic Inflation: This measure is generally taken from the 
amount of tax the government has resorted to placing on its 
population to boost revenue. This is an indicator of the country's 
economic difficulty and the government's ability to handle it. The 
country may be considered at risk when the government is using the 
inflation tax. 
Financial Repression: This measures the difference between 
short term assets in u.s. dollars and time deposits in the domestic 
currency adjusted for exchange rate changes. A positive value 
indicates t.hat these deposits are threatened by the inflation tax. 
A difference in favor of the dollar denominated assets indicates 
more capital flight. 
The Risk Premium: This is the risk premium as stated in 
Dooley(1986) and represents the risk non-residents associate with 
the possibility of being 'taxed' by the subject country's 
--
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government. As this risk increases, capital flight should decrease 
as the risk for residents and non-residents equalizes. 
The author's regression analysis of these variables supports 
his statement that these are important determinants of capital 
flight. The author concludes that measures of external influences 
upon a country and their effect on its ability to service debt may 
give a more complete representation of a country's financial 
position. These measures would be useful in evaluating the 
country's creditworthiness and investment attractiveness. 
8) Rating Services and Country Risk 
The final article included in this paper focuses on existing 
ratings services and their views of the ways to measure a country's 
risk. "Of Tin Hats and Crystal Balls" by Michael Blanden of THE 
BANKER, reviews several firms' practices in rating country risk. 
Seemingly a standard in the rating field, International 
Country Risk Guide, uses 24 criteria separated into political 
risks, financial risks, and economic risks, to arrive at their 
ratings. other firms may use more or fewer criteria depending on 
their view of each criteria's importance. Nearly all current 
rating services for bankers use some mix of subjective and 
objective variables. The ratio varies between services but all 
agree that neither one acceptably encompasses a good measure of 
risk, but by combining them together they hope to capture a more 
accurate assessment of the country's position. 
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9) Summary and Conclusions: 
I have examined eight articles, ranging from international 
debt forecasting models to a review of the thoughts from country 
risk evaluators on their methods. Some authors used single 
forecasts as predictors of rescheduling while others argued for 
combination forecasts and other techniques. Most studies weight 
their variables in some way, like the PILI by Dr. Abdullah and the 
odds matrix method in Mascarenhas and Sand. Others preferred to 
use the objective data as is. There is almost an infinite number 
of methods that can be used in evaluating a country's debt 
servicing capability. This is due to the fact that there is a 
multitude of variables of different degrees of availability and 
with different degrees of perceived importance. The usefulness of 
a forecasting model is determined by its ability to produce timely 
and accurate predictions of the economic future of a particular 
country. The usefulness increases as the model becomes more 
accurate and timely for more countries and for a more distant time 
horizon. Because the global economic situation is rapidly 
changing, because accurate and timely country information is hard 
to come by, and because drastic changes within the countries is 
always possible, the task of creating this useful forecast is very 
difficult. These volatile factors make it difficult to define 
parameters in which to judge forecasts and results may appear 
different to different people. Objective forecasts cannot even be 
truly evaluated because standards for decision making are not 
agreed upon and the whole process becomes very much subjective in 
-. 
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judging the level at which factors become important in classifying 
countries, 'at risk'. Separate forecasts may arrive at separate 
conclusions for the same country. Factors such as the time frame 
of the data on which the forecast is based and the types and number 
of variables included make each forecast very different. 
Does this mean that debt rescheduling forecasts are not 
valuable? No, of course not. Something is better than nothing, 
for the alternative is either blind lending or no lending at all. 
Blind lending would without doubt, lead to catastrophic losses, and 
no lending at all would deprive the lenders of what can be 
sUbstantial returns. What it does mean is that there is 
sUbstantial room for improvement in the field of forecasting, and 
a need for ongoing scrutiny of the current forecasting techniques. 
The last ten years have seen a great improvement in the risk 
evaluation ability of banks and rating services and with the 
continuing improvement of information gathering and analysis, we 
should see more improvement in the future. The global financial 
markets have provided an invaluable service to the developing 
countries, helping them to raise the standard of living of their 
residents while, in some cases, generating substantial returns to 
the lending institutions. Improvement in the ability of evaluating 
risk and debt servicing capability of these developing countries 
will enable the process to become more efficient and profitable. 
New techniques of using existing forecasts by combining objective 
and subjective analysis or using the odds matrix type weighting 
approach also show promise. Innovations in this field should 
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increase the usefulness of the forecasts being produced. As 
standardization of information continues to develop and the methods 
become more refined both in what variables are important to include 
in a forecast, in sUbjective as well as in objective forecasts, and 
in how the~se forecasts can be used in conjunction to better 
evaluate a country, we should see the available investment 
opportunities increase and the ability of Third World countries to 
develop, improve. 
